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Discourse and Representation: A comment on Batel and Castro ‘Re-opening the dialogue 
between the theory of social representations and discursive psychology 
 
In their informative and thoughtful paper, Batel and Castro (2018) propose to integrate, 
conceptually and empirically social representations theory (SRT) and discursive psychology 
(DP), two strands of European social psychology that have had at least until recently, a 
somehow turbulent and uneasy relationship. I congratulate Batel and Castro’s effort, not 
least because in the last thirty years or so in which discursive psychology and social 
representational theorists have battled out their differences, psychology and social 
psychology have become less heterogeneous and less theoretical, much more inclined to 
rely on short, self-contained empirical studies that address a limited, at times narrow, 
domain. In this context, it is important to sustain theoretical and methodological debate as 
well as to find common ground.  As the authors argue, a more systematic exchange could 
lead to an enlargement in the boundaries of both perspectives, offering us a more 
comprehensive understanding of meaning-making processes and social change.  
 
We have much to learn from DP and SRT. Decades of research in both fields have shown 
that the operations of discourse and representation are central to understanding human 
psychology. Humans use language through complex conversational interaction which not 
only establishes the propositional content that guides action in everyday life, but also 
modalities of relating and feeling, all integral to the construction and transformation of 
social representations. Rich analyses of highly relevant and pressing societal issues, from the 
now canonical work on nationalism (Billig, 1995) and racism (Wetherell & Potter, 1992) to 
research on madness (Jodelet, 1991), human rights (Doise, 2002) and psychoanalysis 
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(Moscovici, 2008) express a much needed psychology that focuses on peoples’ interaction 
as they live their lives (Wiggins and Potter, 2008).  
 
Batel and Castro offer an excellent overview and synthesis of two fields that are neither 
easy to summarise nor amenable to simple categorisation. They map out sources and are 
bold in tracing variations, even if challenging the self-interpretation of some exponents 
(Potter, 2018). For Batel and Castro, as for many researchers working with these shared 
assumptions, understanding meaning and social change requires a combined analysis of 
both communication and discourse, with methods focusing simultaneously on content, 
format and processes (Andreouli, Greenland & Howarth, 2016, Gibson, 2015; Greenland, 
Andreouli, Augoustinos & Taulke-Johnson, 2018).   
 
I am in general agreement with Batel and Castro’s argument not least because contrarian 
dialogues unsettle comfort zones and push interlocutors into listening to alternative views. I 
accept the framework through each they assess the history and potential agreement 
between the approaches and the effort to systematise a pragmatic thematic analysis that 
investigates both content and format as inroads to discourse and representation. 
Importantly, they recover the centrality of communicative interaction as the driving force of 
social representations, an axiom frequently ignored by both critics and social 
representations’ researchers alike, but fundamental for Moscovici’s theory as presented in 
the second part of his study of psychonalysis (Moscovici, 2008).  Going beyond the 
propositional and semantic dimensions of representation to encompass its relational and 
discursive dimensions is one distinctive contribution of this paper. The other is to translate 
this theoretical integration into a detailed methodological approach which brings to fruition 
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an extensive empirical programme on how communication formats at the individual, 
relational and societal levels drive representational processes and social change (see also 
Castro and Batel, 2008; Castro, 2012; Batel and Castro, 2009, Castro and Mouro, 2016). I see 
in this framework an effort to capture the complexity of meaning in context, compatible 
with, and indeed requiring, analytical intersections with processes of social identity, 
collective action, history, power and social change (Batel and Castro, 2015; Drury and 
Reicher, 2000; Elcheroth, Doise & Reicher, 2011;  Howarth, 2006; Liu & Hilton, 2005).  
 
In what follows, I focus on two inter-related issues of theory and method, which continue to 
generate tensions for social psychologists studying discourse and representations: the status 
of psychological entities and the methodological toolkit available to the study of meaning in 
context.  
 
On the Psychological and the Social, Again 
Central to a substantive social psychology has been the assumption that psychological 
constructs are not ‘located’ in the individual mind but originate instead in communicative 
action between individuals, groups, institutions and communities. While this tradition has a 
long history and considerable hold in European social psychology (Israel & Tajfel, 1972; Farr, 
1996), it continues to struggle to enter the walls of psychology (Valsiner, 2009). There are 
historical reasons for this situation, such as the separation between Wundt’s first and 
second psychologies (Cole, 1996), which sharply divided experimental and social 
psychologies. However, the present conjuncture also plays a part, in particular institutional 
determinants that privilege the natural sciences and make ‘the social’ a troubled construct 
in Western psychology departments. The result is a predominantly individualistic way of 
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understanding ‘the cognitive’, depriving it of a developmental history and socio-cultural 
setting. Locked inside the head of an individual, rather than studied as it evolves in the 
species, in different cultures and throughout the life course, cognition is equated to the 
mental as asocial and ahistorical, without any reference to the external world, including the 
body and action. This conception of cognition is clearly hegemonic in Western psychology. 
However, it is unfortunate (and somehow ironic) that this dominant and quite limited 
conception should be taken as an ontological reality that justifies the dismissal of cognitive 
phenomena. Alternatives to this conception are at the core of socio-cultural traditions in 
psychology and can be found not only in social psychology but also in many other areas of 
the discipline (Condor & Figgou, 2012; Leman, 2002; Doise, 2003; Doise, Mugny & Perret-
Clermont, 1975; Vygotsky, 1997).  
 
I return to this issue because the ontological status of psychological constructs (or an inner 
mental life) has been called into sharp question by specific traditions of DP, whose emphasis 
on action (Potter, 2018, 2010; Wiggins & Potter, 2008) is amenable to be interpreted as 
rejection of psychological entities (Jovchelovitch, 1996; Van Dijk, 2012).  Action is central 
and in this we are in agreement. However, what is in an action if not the full intentionality 
and agency of a subject, who knows, feels and understands the object-world cognitively, 
emotionally and socially? Action without psychological entities can suggest a number of 
dichotomies of the type inner/outer, mind/behaviour, mental/contextual, cognition/action, 
linguistic/representational. SRT avoids these dichotomies through a focus on processes of 
representing and a triangular model of meaning-making in context and time (Bauer and 
Gaskell, 1999; Castro, 2015; Jovchelovitch, 2007/2019) that goes back to the notion of 
semiotic mediation (Vygotsky, 1978). This insight has been articulated not only in Moscovici 
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(2000) and Markova’s dialogical theory (Marková, 2003; 2016), but to my mind is equally 
expressed in Billig’s exploration of thought as argumentation and the unconscious as 
conversation (Billig, 1999, 1987). It can be traced back to Vygotsky’s genetic law of cultural 
development, which inscribed the primacy of social interaction in the core of human 
psychology. From a socio-cultural perspective, cognition and other ‘mental’, inner 
psychological entities are internalised sociality (Vygotsky, 1997). 
 
Batel and Castro point to the issue when they refer to work that shows how inner dialogue 
and argumentation between self, other and mediating parties, be them experts (Castro and 
Batel, 2008) or third parties (Batel and Castro, 2015) permeate both the life of the self and 
the structure of representations. The argumentative and rhetorical strategies found in the 
dialogue between self-other-object are the inter-subjective processes that build 
representation, and higher psychological functions. They are precisely the locus of 
individual-environment co-construction, in which inner-outer connect.   
 
What is in a Method? 
In proposing a methodological integration of thematic and discourse analysis, Batel and 
Castro systematise what they argue is already in practice. A new generation of social 
psychologists is prepared to mix and match concepts and methodologies with creative 
rigour, without paying too much attention to orthodoxy. ‘Undisciplined’ is the word 
retrieved from Billig’s work, their very paper an excellent demonstration of this irreverence. 
They do not seem at all concerned with preserving the ‘purity’ and focus of methodologies; 
rather they want to juxtapose a set of relevant theoretical questions to a set of research 
questions and analytical tools.  
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This is liberating for a discipline that historically has privileged the evaluation of methods 
per se rather than what is the appropriate fit between method, research question and 
context at hand. Focus on the fitness of methodology to question and situation enables 
repositioning methodologies as a function rather than a driver of the research process. It 
also allows an understanding of the limitations as well as potentials of any one research 
method; recognising that all share some limitations and adopting a ‘one size does not fit all’ 
approach prevents methodological monotheism and enables adjustment to contextual 
diversity and research questions.  
 
A case in point is the use of interviews, vigorously criticised over the years by Potter and 
colleagues. One of the merits of this work is to identify the problems that lurk in the 
methodology, some of them endemic and difficult to correct (Potter and Hepburn, 2005; 
Antaki, 2006). They argue against the excessive use of interviews and propose naturalistic 
methods of data collection as an alternative. I have no disagreement with the need to 
identify limitations in methodology and the richness of naturalistic data. Indeed, there is 
much to gain in working with this type of unobtrusive material (Lee, 2000), which are made 
widely available today by new technologies. However, as with all methodologies, they do 
have limitations and do not fit all research situations. First, just as with the outcome of 
interviews and experiments as soon as they become data, they become a research device, in 
which researchers are implicated from the start (Devereux, 1967). They are not free from 
researchers’ agendas and we need to work through this implication, recognising that it can 
both hinder and help the research process.  
 
7 
 
Second, naturalistic data do not fit all research situations and need to be considered in 
relation to the pragmatics and contextual demands of the research process. There are 
instances in which control of the research process is not in the hands of researchers only 
(Aveling & Jovchelovitch, 2014), a constant and major challenge for those working in hard-
to-reach, culturally specific contexts of adversity for instance (Fals-Borda, 1988). Clinical 
critical interviews (Piaget, 1926) or narrative interviews (Jovchelovitch and Bauer, 2000) can 
work very well when communities want to tell their stories and feel that dialogue with 
researchers is something they would benefit from  (Jovchelovitch and Priego-Hernandez, 
2013). Making sense of the dialogue staged between interviewer and interviewee (Farr, 
1990) enables systematising representations, discourses and practices of relevant 
communities as they live their lives and cope with innovation in the public sphere (Mouro 
and Castro, 2012). Importantly, this practice of listening to participants matters immensely 
to those whose voices are marginalised and see research as an opportunity to build 
partnerships that enable visibility to their knowledge, experience and way of life.   
 
Ultimately, we need to introduce cultural categories in our theoretical and methodological 
thinking because the manner in which we obtain data is a complex social and psychological 
negotiation that plays differently in different socio-cultural contexts. Methodological 
pluralism rather than strict adherence to any one single methodology works best for the 
study of meaning-making in the context in which people live their lives. Be it recording 
naturally occurring conversation in a UK helpline, interviewing urban residents and experts 
in Portugal or children in a favela territory in Brazil, social psychologists can draw on the 
resources of a plural suite of methodologies that are open to creative use and 
transformation as they adjust to different research settings. In considering the participation 
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inherent in all observation, and being fully aware of our own implication in the process, we 
are in a better position to build an authentic relationship between our agendas as 
researchers and the research itself.  
 
Conclusion 
In bringing together discourse and representation, Batel and Castro illuminate many of the 
central issues underlying our own representations and practices as researchers operating at 
a particular and troubled conjuncture. They tackle head on that most elusive of goals, which 
is the understanding of psychological phenomena as verb and noun, as both emergent 
property of agentic everyday social interaction and consolidated outcome of historical 
phenomena of cultural and political spheres. By investigating what is productive in the 
tensions between theoretical traditions, they disrupt our comfort zones and push self-
contained theories and methods in social psychology. As Doise remarked, “…every 
explanatory model in social psychology is always insufficient on its own and needs the 
intervention of other explanations to account more fully for the conditions that are 
necessary for the dynamics described by a model to function”(Doise, 2004, p.176).  
 
I have drawn on socio-cultural traditions of research to reiterate the importance of 
recognising psychological entities and avoiding dichotomies between inner/outer, 
mental/social, linguistic/ representational. Following Batel and Castro’s methodological 
integration, I have also suggested a polytheist methodological attitude focusing on the best 
fit between research questions, context and methods for generating and analysing data.  
Social psychology can benefit from a dialogue between its theoretical and methodological 
traditions and contribute to intellectual debates that though currently squeezed out of 
9 
 
psychology have much to say to the discipline as a whole.  Let us continue this debate and 
move forward stronger and less fragmented. 
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